Huntress finds fake crypto PCs on ScreenConnect servers
Huntress suspects the 2,408 fake guest sessions, named after exchanges such as KuCoin and Binance, are bait for technicians whose ScreenConnect clients are unpatched
- Source of the first three fake sessions: a residential IP address in Egypt
- Guest client version claimed by every fake machine: 25.3.4.9288
- Distinct fake machine names counted by Huntress: more than 1,000
- Patched technician client named by Huntress: ScreenConnect 26.6.5
MSPs and organizations that host their own ScreenConnect server are open to the fake enrollments, since ConnectWise makes Access installers downloadable without a login by design. Huntress says the technician-client flaw works in both Support and Access sessions and can run the file with elevated rights. ConnectWise's advisory covers removing the TransferFiles permission from roles and session groups on servers that cannot upgrade yet.
“A tempting ‘crypto server’ is exactly the kind of session a technician might open.”John Hammond, senior principal security researcher, Huntress
Huntress said on 13 November that someone had registered 2,408 fake guest sessions, named after crypto exchanges, on self-hosted ScreenConnect servers since 3 November. Its leading theory is that they are bait for a technician whose client is unpatched.
The sessions sit on 118 servers run by 109 Huntress customers, MSPs among them. Names such as KUCOIN-SRV and LAPTOP-BINANCE pair an exchange with a role. Each shows a preview image of an apparent trading screen and stays online in the console.
The case began on 12 November, when an MSP asked Huntress about machines in its console that nobody there had installed. Its server showed no web shells or new accounts. Its Access installer, which carries the server's relay address, could be downloaded by anyone, and an online file-scanning service had pulled a copy in mid-October, weeks before the first fake session.
Nearly all the sessions connected from one IONOS-hosted address. They have pushed no files and run no commands. A handful of technicians opened one, most leaving within seconds. One typed text into a session twice, which Huntress treated as a possible credential exposure and raised with the MSP.
The bait theory
Huntress ties the theory to a critical client flaw ConnectWise disclosed on 8 September: a hostile guest can push a file that an unpatched technician's machine runs without asking, and a separate campaign is already exploiting it. Huntress has not seen the fake sessions used that way, and found no overlap with the SCKit worm it reported on 11 November.
Public discussion had put the sessions down to Joe Sandbox detonating ScreenConnect installers. Huntress says the sessions carry no client key, recycle seven sets of screenshots and revisited the same servers in the same order every day, which it reads as the work of a scripted emulator.
Sources
- Huntress, “Attackers use Crypto Exchange Names to Disguise Unauthorized Sessions on 100+ ScreenConnect Servers”, blog, John Hammond, 13 November 2026. https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-crypto-exchange-sessions-screenconnect
- ConnectWise, ScreenConnect security bulletin, 8 September 2026. https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin

